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Ev er since ET, the ex traterrestrial, was lured from his hiding place with
Reese's Pieces, manufacturers hav e recognized the tremendous power of mov ies and other artistic
works to shape consumer attitudes toward their products. Often these associations are ex tremely
positiv e-prompting manufacturers to pay huge fees to hav e their products prominently featured in
films and telev ision programming.
But not all mentions are welcome. Frequently , artists and trademark owners clash when "marks" are
made the subject of parodies, satires, or other allegedly negativ e portray als. Inv ariably , the
trademark owners respond with federal infringement claims and state law claims based on unfair
competition and antidilution.
Basics of Infringem ent Claim s
The underly ing tenet of the federal trademark law, the Lanham Act (1 5 U.S.C. §§ 1 051 -1 1 29), is
consumer protection. First and foremost, the law is designed to protect the "source identify ing"
function of trademarks-to preserv e a trademark's ability to identify the prov ider of the goods or
serv ices associated with the mark. (Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 41 8 (2003).)
As such, the touchstone of trademark infringement is consumer confusion. Fundamentally , plaintiffs
asserting infringement stemming from unauthorized use of their products and trademarks in artistic
works argue that consumers are likely to think that the mov ie, literary work, song, or other artistic
depiction is endorsed by , sponsored by , or somehow affiliated with the plaintiffs' trademarked
products. (See, Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods, 7 3 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1 996); Caterpillar v.
Walt Disney Studios, 287 F. Supp. 2d 91 3 (N.D. Ill. 2003)).
Dilution: Blurring and T arnishm ent
Unlike infringement's focus on consumer protection, trademark dilution laws are closer to earned
property rights-with the focus on protecting the mark owner's ability to control how the trademark is
used or display ed. The first ty pe of dilution, called blurring, encompasses claims that a defendant's use
of a trademark will lessen association of the mark with a plaintiff's product. The second ty pe,
tarnishment, is based on a defendant's conduct that places the trademark in an unsav ory light, causing
negativ e associations with the mark.
Blurring claims are best illustrated by Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1 1 7 1 (2003)), which inv olv ed the toy maker's claim that a music group
diluted its trademark by using the name Barbie in the group's song "Barbie Girl." Although absolv ing
the defendant of liability , the court acknowledged that the defendant's use was blurring, in that "after
the song's popular success, some consumers hearing Barbie's name will think of both the doll and the
song, or perhaps of the song only ." (296 F. 3d at 904.)
The driv ing concern in most trademark dilution cases inv olv ing artistic works is tarnishment. In these
cases plaintiffs allege that the artists' depictions or use of the plaintiffs' trademarks degrade the marks'
reputation. For ex ample, in Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp. (286 F. Supp. 2d 1 254 (N.D.
Cal. 2003)), the producers of the mov ie Dickie Roberts: Former Child Star were sued for their comical
misuse of the plaintiff's trademarked Slip-n-Slide toy .
A sampling of cases from v arious courts rev eals analogous claims of damages to commercial
reputation by association with:
1 . sex and obscenity (Dallas Cow boy Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1 97 9) (associating plaintiffs-cheerleaders with pornographic mov ie));
2. illegal narcotic activ ity (Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1 1 83 (E.D.N.Y 1 97 2)
(Coke trademark display ed on poster with words Enjoy Cocaine in place of Enjoy Coke));
3. unfav orable social and political outcomes (Caterpillar v. Walt Disney Studios, 287 F. Supp. 2d 91 3
(2003) (plaintiff's bulldozers used to tear down a rain forest)); and
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4. a notorious murder trial (Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1 559 (S.D. Cal.
1 996), aff'd, 1 09 F.3d 1 394 (9th Cir. 1 997 ) (using plaintiff's trademarked character in a satirical book
about the O. J. Simpson murder case)).
Where the Law Is Now
Unauthorized depictions in artistic works present unique analy tical problems. Obv iously , distributing
the latest bestseller book and the nex t blockbuster mov ie are commercial activ ities within the ambit
of federal commerce power-the ultimate constitutional source for federal trademark laws. It is
therefore understandable that trademark law requires that the alleged dilution must amount to a
"commercial use in commerce." (1 5 U.S.C. § 1 1 25). Despite falling within the reach of Congress's
regulatory power by being "in commerce," howev er, most artistic uses of another's trademark would
still be considered "noncommercial" in the First Amendment sense-that is, outside the definitional
bounds of the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine.
Because these same books and mov ies do more than propose a commercial transaction, the uses fall
squarely into core, protected speech under the First Amendment-affording defendants constitutional
and statutory defenses inapplicable to pure commercial speech. In addition, artistic uses prov ide
inherent defenses related to consumer sophistication and noncompetitiv e intent not av ailable to
unauthorized uses in the commercial sphere.
T radem ark Infringem ent
The federal circuits use a v ariety of tests to determine whether the defendant's
conduct creates the "likelihood of confusion" necessary to establish trademark infringement.
Essentially , all v ariations of the tests focus on some combination of the same eight factors: strength of
the plaintiff's mark, prox imity of the plaintiff's and defendant's goods, similarity of marks, ev idence of
actual confusion, marketing channels used, ty pe of goods and degree of care likely to be ex ercised by
the purchaser, the defendant's intent in selecting the mark, and likelihood of ex pansion of the product
lines. In the contex t of artistic works that do not compete with the trademarked products and
purposefully seek to identify the trademark, howev er, these factors are unwieldy and unartfully
applied. For ex ample, the court in Mattel noted that "when a trademark owner asserts a right to
control how we ex press ourselv es-when people would find it difficult to describe the product any
other way (as in the case of aspirin), or when the mark (like Rolls Roy ce) has taken on an ex pressiv e
meaning apart from its source-identify ing function-apply ing the traditional test fails to account for the
full weight of the public's interest in free ex pression." (296 F.3d at 900.)
In most infringement lawsuits brought against the creators of artistic works, the trademarks are well
known to consumers. In addition, there is usually no doubt that the artists intentionally use the mark
to conjure the plaintiff's mark in v iewers' minds. Despite the intention, howev er, it is clear that the
defendants' unauthorized use of the mark for artistic purposes does not promote a competing product.
That absence of direct competition between the trademark owner and the artist substantially lessens
the likelihood of consumer confusion. As a result, there is ty pically little ev idence showing that
defendants were attempting to shortcut their way to an unfair and unearned commercial adv antage by
using the plaintiffs' marks. Thus, when considering the distinctiv e markets and consumer
sophistication, it appears unlikely that artistic works-especially creativ e works of fiction-will actually
confuse consumers regarding an implied endorsement or sponsorship.
Also, in cases in which the purpose of a defendant's use is to identify a plaintiff's product, ev en if the
ultimate goal is to describe a defendant's own product, the Ninth Circuit recognizes a nominativ e fair
use defense to infringement suits. Such cases are ty pified by Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., in which the
court ruled that the defendant's unauthorized use of Princess Diana's name and likeness on its
products was nominativ e fair use, because the use merely described the defendants' "Diana-related
products" and did not imply that the plaintiff sponsored or endorsed them. (292 F.3d 1 1 39 at 1 1 51
(9th Cir. 2002)). In these cases, trademark law's three-factor nominativ e fair use test is used in lieu of
the multifactored likelihood-of-confusion test. It requires that the plaintiff's product must not be
readily identifiable without the mark, only so much of the mark may be used as is reasonably
necessary to identify the plaintiff's product, and the defendant must do nothing suggesting the
plaintiff's sponsorship or endorsement.
Most courts recently hav e sy mpathized with defendants asserting these defenses. In Hormel, WhamO, and Caterpillar the courts ex pressly noted that mov iegoers-ev en children-would understand that
the marks were being depicted to achiev e a humorous effect, and since they realize the fantastical
nature of the genre, they would not be deceiv ed into believ ing the plaintiffs endorsed the mov ies in
which their marks appeared. In addition, courts recognize the paradox inherent when a plaintiff
alleges confusion while asserting a tarnishment claim: If the trademark is disparaged, misused, or
placed in a negativ e contex t by defendant's depiction, there is little likelihood that a reasonable
consumer will be fooled into thinking that the trademark owner sponsored or endorsed the portray al.
(See, Mattel, 296 F.3d 894 (song mocking the v alues represented by Barbie dolls would not cause
confusion as to Mattel's sponsorship).) Finally , recent cases inv olv ing nominativ e fair use defenses
hav e all decidedly found for the defendants. Though stated in different way s, the message is
unequiv ocal: In the absence of a clear showing of economic harm, courts are not interested in
protecting the purely sy mbolic or ex pressiv e aspects of trademarks.
Ev en when plaintiffs can establish some likelihood of confusion, the First Amendment may protect the
allegedly infringing artistic use. For ex ample, in Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Second Circuit found the
defendant's use of Ginger Rogers's name in a mov ie title to be protected, holding that, generally , the
Lanham Act "should be construed to apply to artistic works only where the public interest in av oiding
consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free ex pression." (87 5 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1 989).)
Finding that the motion picture's title bore some artistic relev ance to the underly ing work, the court
refused to find infringement, ev en though some mov iegoers may hav e mistakenly believ ed that
Rogers was associated with the film. The public interest in free ex pression outweighed the concern
about consumer confusion.
Similarly , in Mattel, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Rogers balancing test to reject Mattel's

Similarly , in Mattel, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Rogers balancing test to reject Mattel's
infringement claim concerning the musical composition "Barbie Girl." In apply ing the test, the court
concluded that any confusion occasioned by the song title was outweighed by free speech concerns.
The Rogers and Mattel balancing approach represents a significant departure from the earlier
"alternativ e av enues test." This approach is best ex emplified by the Dallas Cow boy Cheerleaders case,
in which the court found the defendant-filmmaker liable, concluding that it could hav e ex pressed its
message about sex uality in athletics by an alternativ e method that did not ev oke the plaintiff's mark.
(604 F.2d at 206).
Ostensibly , both approaches remain v alid. Howev er, some courts and commentators hav e argued for
ex panding the balancing test (Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 1 1 2 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y .
2000)), while concurrently the trend seems to be to narrowly interpret-if not ignore outright-the
Cheerleaders alternativ e-av enues test in fav or of the Rogers balancing approach. For ex ample, in the
recently decided case of Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., the Ninth Circuit rejected the
plaintiff's copy right, trademark, trade dress, and state law claims, apply ing the Rogers test to the title
of a photographic series, "Food Chain Barbie," in which the artist, without authorization,
photographed nude Barbie dolls in absurd and sex ual circumstances inv olv ing food preparation.
(2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26294.)
T radem ark Dilution
After the Supreme Court's recent decision in Moseley, stating a claim under the Federal Trade Dilution
Act or FTDA (1 5 U.S.C. § 1 1 25(c)) has become a two-step process. The first step is for a plaintiff to
show that its trademark is famous, the defendant used the mark after it became famous, the defendant
put the mark to a commercial use in commerce, and its mark suffered actual dilution. (Moseley, 537
U.S. 41 8). The second and often decisiv e step is determining whether the use falls into one of the
FTDA's enumerated ex emptions, absolv ing the defendant from liability .
Courts ty pically consider six factors in assessing whether an artist's use erodes a trademark's productev oking qualities sufficiently to establish a blurring claim: similarity of the plaintiff's and the
defendant's mark, similarity of the plaintiff's and the defendant's products, sophistication of
consumers, any predatory intent by the defendant, renown of the plaintiff's mark, and renown of the
defendant's mark. In many cases inv olv ing artistic works, the blurring framework is inapposite: Artists
use or display the trademarked product to specifically identify the trademarked product and no other
product.
In most instances, referencing a product in an artistic work will not lessen the identify ing power of the
mark; to the contrary , presenting the mark in a motion picture or parody ing it in a magazine will more
likely heighten association of the mark with the plaintiff's product. As the court noted in Hormel, a
case in which the meat company sued ov er the creation and merchandising of a wild boar puppet
named Spa'am: "There is v ery little likelihood that Henson's parody will weaken the association
between the mark SPAM and Hormel's luncheon meat. Instead, like other spoofs, Henson's parody will
tend to increase public identification of Hormel's mark with Hormel." (7 3 F.3d at 506.) Only in limited
instances, such as the song title in Mattel, will a mark in an artistic work be used to identify another
trademarked product, rendering blurring analy sis relev ant.
After Moseley, it is also apparent that tarnishment claims against artistic works will not succeed
without clear ev idence of consumer confusion and resulting economic damage. Indeed, it remains
unclear whether tarnishment is still a v iable claim under the FTDA. In any ev ent, asserting such
claims appears to hav e little chance of succeeding in the face of the "noncommercial use" ex ception to
the FTDA. (1 5 U.S.C. §§ 1 1 25(c)(4)(b)). The ex ception, the parameters of which track the U.S. Supreme
Court's commercial speech doctrine, appears to shield motion pictures and other artistic ex pressions
from most blurring and tarnishment liability .
Undeniably , trademarked products hav e ev olv ed into sy mbols for v alues, ideas, and ex periences that
help shape popular cultures. Increasingly , artists reference these marks as a way of effectiv ely
communicating their ex pressiv e message. In recognition of this broader role of trademarks, courts
hav e narrowed the reach of trademark law to allow that trademarks be more freely incorporated in
artistic works.
Robert C. Welsh is a partner and Pratheepan Gulasekaram is an associate at O'Melveny & Myers in
Century City.
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